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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
"essentially" employees and as such protected by R.S. 23:921.
It would seem that the problem in this area also relates to the
proper interpretation of the statute in that the courts must
decide exactly who is to be considered within the statute's defi-
nition of employee. It appears that the courts, although using
divergent reasoning, have reached the most equitable result
in the majority of the partnership and association cases, but
have done so at the expense of certainty. The statute, as drafted,
seems to apply only to the strict employer-employee relation-
ship, and not to a partner or associate. Interpreting the statute
in this way, the courts could still reach just results in partner-
ship and association noncompetition agreement litigation by
using the reasonableness test.
In the final analysis, the perplexities of many of the non-
competition clause cases could be clarified by a more uniform
court interpretation of R.S. 23:921. As this is unlikely, it is
suggested that the legislature amend the statute to eliminate the
uncertainty surrounding its meaning. In this way the Louisiana
courts would have a more efficient and workable vehicle to
determine the validity of noncompetition agreements.
James M. Duncan
MASTER'S VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR TORTS UNDER
ARTICLE 2320-A TERMINOLOGICAL "TAR-BABY"
Under Civil Code article 176, "the master is answerable for
the offenses and quasi-offenses committed by his servants,
according to the rules which are explained under the title: Of
quasi-contracts, and of offenses and quasi-offenses." Thus a mas-
ter's liability for physical harm caused by the negligent conduct
of his servant is governed by Civil Code articles 2315-2320, espe-
cially article 2320. It is the purpose of this Comment to examine
the exact and concise distinction between the master-servant
and principal-agent relationships insofar as liability for the negli-
gent tort of a servant or a non-servant agent is concerned. A
study of article 2320, its judicial "amendment" and a view of the
jurisprudence in four particular areas' will emphasize the dis-
1. The four areas that have given the courts particular difficulty deal
with the liability for the torts resulting In physical injury in the following
cases: the husband for the wife's automobile accidents; the automobile dealer
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tinction now being made by the Louisiana Supreme Court 2
between masters and principals concerning their liability for
the physical torts of their servants and non-servant agents,
respectively.
Distinction Between Servant and Non-Servant Agent
The legal and factual distinction between a servant and a
non-servant agent is an important one, for both under the Lou-
isiana Civil Code and at common law, the master is liable for the
torts of his servant, while the principal is not liable for the torts
of a non-servant agent resulting in physical harm.8 Article 2320
provides that "masters and employers are answerable for the
damage occasioned by their servants and overseers, in the exer-
cise of functions in which they are employed." (Emphasis
added.) No mention is made in article 2320 of a principal's lia-
bility for the damage caused by his agent, and under the doctrine
that "there is no liability in this state for damages sounding in
tort except where it is expressly or impliedly authorized by the
codal [sic] articles and statutes of the state,"4 no such liability
should be imposed. The Civil Code articles dealing with man-
date are found in Book III-Of the Different Modes of Acquiring
the Ownership of Things-and deal with only the contractual
nature of the principal-mandatary relationship, not the tort
liability of principals for the negligent conduct of their non-
servant agents.
The factual distinction between an agent and a servant is
most important. The Restatement (Second) of Agency defines
an agent as the fiduciary who acts for a principal with his con-
sent and under his control.0 Using the same agency terminology,
for the prospective purchaser's accidents; the oil producing company for
the distributor's accidents; and the state for the accidents of its convicts
and prisoners.
2. See Blanchard v. Ogima, 253 La. 34, 215 So.2d 902 (1968).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 250 (1957): "A principal is not
liable for physical harm caused by the negligent physical conduct of a non-
servant agent during the performance of the principal's business ......
4. Adams v. Golson, 187 La. 363, 369, 174 So. 876, 878 (1937).
5. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2985-3033.
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1957): "(1) Agency is the fidu-
ciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person
to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control,
and consent by the other so to act.
"(2) The one for whom action is to be taken is the principal.
"(3) The one who is to act is the agent."
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a servant is defined as "an agent employed by a master to per-
form service in his affairs whose physical conduct in the per-
formance of the service is controlled or is subject to the right
to control by the master. ' ' 7 It is the right to control the physical
movements of the servant in the performance of his master's
business that differentiates the servant from the non-servant
agent and serves as the basis for imposing liability for the ser-
vant's torts on the master. Thus a principal who neither con-
trols nor has the right to control the details of an agent's physi-
cal movements will not be responsible for the agent's negligence
while he is performing the authorized transaction.8 In light of
the above distinctions, it is apparent that "although a servant
may possess the qualities of an agent, all agents do not qualify
as servants."
Historical Development of Respondeat Superior
A view of the differing scholarly theories on the historical
development of respondeat superior'o should accompany defini-
tions of the terminology so that the nature of the vicarious lia-
bility imposed by article 2320 can be better understood. Holmes
traced the development back through the frankpledge" 1 of Saxon
origin to the responsibility of the Roman paterfamilias for the
torts of his slaves.'2 This unlimited liability arose from what
had been merely a privilege of buying the forgiveness of a party
offended by the slave by paying for the slave's offense.13 It was
extended by the praetor in some cases to the misconduct of the
7. Id. § 2(2).
8. Id. § 240, comment: "It is only when to the relation of principal and
agent there is added that right to control physical details as to the manner
of performance which is characteristic of the relation of master and servant
that the person in whose service the act is done becomes subject to liability
for the physical conduct of the actor."
9. Blanchard v. Ogima, 253 La. 34, 47, 215 So.2d 902, 906 (1968).
10. The term "respondeat superior" literally means "let the master
answer," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1475 (4th ed. 1951), and is used to describe
the master's vicarious liability for the torts of his servants done within the
scope of the servants' employment, See, e.g., James v. J. S. Williams & Son,
177 La. 1033, 1039, 150 So. 9, 11 (1933).
11. Holmes, Agency, 4 HARv. L. REV. 345, 355 (1891): "[Tlhe master was
made the pledge of his servants to hand them over to justice or to pay the
fine himself."
12. Id. at 364: "[T]he common law has started from the patria Potestas
and the frithborhi-whether following or simply helped by the Roman law,
it does not matter,-and that it has worked itself out to Its limits through
the formula of identity."
13. Id. at 350.
[Vol. 33
COMMENTS
free servants of innkeepers and shipowners, masters in whom the
public had special confidence. 14 This same extension of liability
gradually developed into the identity fiction: the act of the ser-
vant is the act of the master and they are considered as one per-
son, conferring upon the master the benefit of the act if it is
right and the responsibility for it if it is wrong.1 5 One legal
writer has taken opposition to the identity fiction, stating that
the basis for the rule was the public policy of holding a business-
man responsible for his servant's torts to minimize the distur-
bance to the balance of social order.1 6 Lord Holt, through dicta
found in a series of cases beginning in 1690, made "a conscious
effort to adjust the rule of law to the expediency of mercantile
affairs";1 7 thus began the modern doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior, though such reliance on dicta has not been without sharp
criticism.18
French and Louisiana Code Prvisions
The historical source for the respondeat superior doctrine
in Louisiana is found in articles 1382-1384 of the Code Napoleon.
Article 1384, which is the basis for Louisiana Civil Code article
2320, provides that "masters and trustees [are responsible], for
14. Id.
15. Id. at 351.
16. Laski, The Basai of Vicarioue Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 112 (1916):
'if that employer is compelled to bear the burden of his servant's torts
even when he is himself personally without fault, it is because in a social
distribution of profit and loss, the balance of least disturbance seems thereby
best to be obtained."
Laski felt that Lord Holt had created the modern theories of respondeat
superior and said: "tIlt may be urged that Holt found good reason for the
incisive certitude of his dicta in an age which saw so enormous a growth
of corporate enterprise." Id. at 113.
Maitland is also critical of any "slave-master" analogy since he points
out that by the end of the twelfth century slavery was practically extinct
and "almost every vestige of the lord's liability had disappeared." 2 F. Pot-
LOCK & F. MArTLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 528 (Ist ed. 1895).
Pothier felt such a policy had been established "in order to render mas-
ters cautious not to employ any but careful servants." POTHIER, OBLIGATIONS
no. 121 (Evans transl. 1839).
17. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, in 3 SELECT
ESSAYS IN ANGLo-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 536 (1909).
18. T. BATY, VICARIOUS LuBmrry 28 (1916): "What one would like to know
is the precise process by which Holt's dicta acquired the force of law
between, say, 1698 and 1725 .... It will . . . be clear to most students that
the doctrine of the employer's responsibility was due to no considered theory
of civil liability, and to no survival of early medieval notions, but was
derived from an inconsiderate use of precedents and a blind reliance on the
slightest word of an eminent judge .... .
1972]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the injury caused by their servants and managers in the func-
tions in which they have employed them ... ."9 Speaking of the
exceptional nature of article 1384 that imposes liability on one
through a presumption of fault, Plainol warns that "this text
should receive a strict interpretation, as should all those which
contain legal presumptions. '*O
Louisiana Civil Code articles 2315, 2317 and 2320 impose
liability on the master for the servant's offenses and quasi-
offenses. The Code makes one liable for the damage caused to
another by his own tortious acts and by the tortious acts of
those for whom he is answerable. 2' When the master-servant
(or employer-employee) relationship exists within the exercise
of the function in which the servant is employed, the master is
liable for the servant's torts.22 However, the Code limits this
liability to those cases in which the master might have prevented
the tortious act but did not.
The articles in the Code dealing with mandate confer on the
agent, or mandatary, the legal authority to act judicially for
another and to bind the principal contractually.28 Since "the
object of the mandate must be lawful, and the power conferred
must be one which the principal himself has a right to exer-
cise,'" the non-servant agent can bind the principal only when
he acts in a legal manner in making contractual aagreements.
Since tortious acts of a non-servant agent resulting in physical
harm are neither contractual agreements nor lawful acts which
19. FNENCH Clv. CODa art. 1384 (Barrister of the Inner Temple transl.
1824).
20. 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TRZATISE no. 909A (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
21. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315: "Every act whatever of man that causes dam-
age to another, obliges him by whose fault It happened to repair it ......
Id. art. 2317: "We are responsible, not only for the damage occasioned
by our own act, but for that which is caused by the act of persons for
whom we are answerable, or of the things which we have in our custody.
This, however, is to be understood with the following modifications."
22. Id. art. 2320: "Masters and employers are answerable for the damage
occasioned by their servants and overseers, in the exercise of functions in
which they are employed.
"Teachers and artisans are answerable for the damage caused by their
scholars or apprentices while under their superintendence.
"In the above cases, responsibility only attaches, when the masters or
employers, teachers and artisans, might have prevented the act which caused
the damage, and have not done it." (Emphasis added.)
23. The 'Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 194-1945 Term-
Obligations, Contracts, Mandate, 6 LA. L. Rev. 587, 596 (1946).
24. LA. COv. CoD art. 2987.
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the principal himself could perform, the Code articles on man-
date should not be relied upon to create liability in the principal
for the torts of a non-servant agent.
Judicial "Amendment" of Article 2320
In a number of early cases the last paragraph of article
232025 was strictly interpreted to restrict the application of
respondeat superior to a narrow range of torts committed in the
physical presence of the master, resulting generally in a verdict
for the defendant-master after the plaintiff failed to allege and
prove that the master might have prevented the tortious act and
did not." Several of these were suits by slave owners against
the owners of riverboats onto which their slaves had absconded.F
Until 1841, in order to impose liability on the ship's owner for
the acts of the ship's master in such circumstances, the Louisiana
Supreme Court required the allegation and proof by the slave
owner that the ship owner knew of the ship master's illicit act
and failed to prevent it.2
Although the supreme court applied the limitation in Duncan
v. Hawks,29 a year earlier it had expressed disfavor with such a
restriction and had urged legislative change.P When such change
was not forthcoming, the supreme court began a new line of
jurisprudence disregarding the limitation on the master's lia-
25. Id. art. 2320: "In the above cases, responsibility only attaches when
the masters or employers, teachers and artisans, might have prevented the
act which caused the damage, and have not done it." (Emphasis added.)
26. Palfrey v. Kerr, 8 Mart. (N.S.) 503 (La. 1830); Strawbridge v. Turner
& Woodruff, 8 La. 537 (1835), 9 La. 213 (1836); Burke v. Clarke, 11 La. 206
(1837); Ware v. Barataria & Lafourche Canal Co., 15 La. 169 (1840); Duncan
v. Hawks, 18 La. 548 (1841).
27. Palfrey v. Kerr, 8 Mart.(N.S.) 503 (La. 1830); Strawbridge v. Turner
& Woodruff, 8 La. 537 (1835), 9 La. 213 (1836); Duncan v. Hawks, 18 La. 548
(1841).
28. See, e.g., Palfrey v. Kerr, 8 Mart. (N.S.) 503, 505 (La. 1830): "[Tlhe
plaintiff cannot recover, because he has not shown that the defendant could
have prevented the acts, from which the damages they claim are said to
have resulted."
29. 18 La. 548 (1841).
30. Ware v. Barataria & Lafourche Canal Co., 15 La. 169, 171 (1840): "It
is said that in most cases, the restriction in the code [sic] will do away
entirely with every thing like responsibility in the master or employer ....
This may be and we believe is true, but our duty is to apply the law when
its letter is clear .... The law, if defective, can be modified by that branch
of the government whose province it is to make our laws, or amend them
when experience shows their inadequacy to subserve the purposes of Justice.
This restriction to the liability of masters ... was an unfortunate and unad-
vised departure from the Napoleon Code ......
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bility.3 In the first of these cases, Hart v. New Orleans & Car-
rollton Railroad Co.,82 the court approved the trial judge's re-
fusal to charge the jury according to the limitation, which would
have absolved the master, and noted "if the law were such as is
alleged [by defendant], a master or employer could never be
made responsible for the acts of his agents or servants, unless
he were present and did not endeavor to prevent the act which
caused the damage."8
From the strictly imposed limitation in 1841, the supreme
court made a great shift toward vicarious liability. In McCubbin
v. Hastings,84 a druggist was held civilly liable for a death re-
sulting from the injection of a toxic potion negligently prepared
by his employee while the druggist was absent. The supreme
court refused to apply the previous limitation and said, "we
know that this has never been considered law, and that where
injuries have occurred as the result of carelessness on the part
of the employees of such parties, the principals have been made
to respond in damages."8 5 No cases were cited as authority for
this statement, but the reason for the court's disregard of the
limitation became apparent in Nelson v. Crescent City Railroad
Co38 Quoting from Boilleaux, the court decided the limitation
on liability had never applied to masters under the Code Na-
poleon and should not apply in Louisiana.3
The current posture of the court is reflected in the following
language from Blanchard v. Ogima:38 "the needs of society would
not permit such a stringent and severe limitation of the liability
31. Hart v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R. Co., 1 Rob. 178 (La. 1841);
MoCubbin v. Hastings, 27 La. Ann. 713 (1875); Nelson v. Crescent City R.R.,
49 La. Ann. 491, 21 So. 635 (1897); Anderson v. Elder, 105 La. 672, 30 So. 120
(1901); Weaver v. W. L. Goulden Logging Co., 116 La. 468, 40 So. 798 (1906);
Stanley v. Schumpert, 117 La. 255, 41 So. 565 (1906); Regas v. Douglas, 139
La. 773, 72 So. 242 (1916).
32. 1 Rob. 178 (La. 1841).
33. Id. at 181.
34. 27 La. Ann. 713 (1875).
35. Id. at 717: "If it was the master who did the wrong, the master is
responsible. If it was his servant who did it, he is still responsible, for the
master is responsible for the acts of his servant when done in the course of
his usual employment."
36. 49 La. Ann. 491, 21 So. 635 (1897).
37. Id. at 492, 21 So. at 635: "The commentators on that Code maintain
that masters must be deemed able, by selecting careful servants, to avoid all
damages arising from their acts, and hence the French jurists reach the con-
clusion that inability to prevent the act cannot be urged by masters, when
sought to be made liable for damages caused by their servants."
38. 253 La. 34, 215 So.2d 902 (1968).
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of a master for his servant."8 9 The court concluded that the Code
limitation has fallen into desuetude and is obsolete by failure
of application by the courts, but cited numerous cases as es-
tablishing reasonable definitions and limitations on the master's
vicarious liability.4 The cases cited deal primarily with the
classification of one as an employee and the "scope of employ-
ment."41
Application of Article 2320 to Selected Areas
Though purporting to follow the respondeat superior pro-
visions of the Civil Code, the Louisiana courts have often demon-
strated their misunderstanding of the crucial distinction between
servants and non-servant agents.42 In most cases liability has
been correctly imposed upon the master because the individual
in question has been an agent with servant status, but the oc-
casional case that has held a principal liable for the physical
torts of a non-servant agent is inconsistent with Civil Code
article 2320 and should not be followed.48 The careless and im-
precise use of agency terminology by the Louisiana courts has
created problems in several particular areas.
Husband's Liability for Wife's Torts
The effort of the courts to place the family's financial re-
sponsibility behind the injuries inflicted by family members
while operating vehicles "has given rise to one of the most
colorful chapters in American tort history."'44 American common
law jurisdictions developed the "family purpose" doctrine to
deal with the problem,45 but the doctrine is not applicable in
39. Id. at 43, 215 So.2d at 905.
40. id. at 43-44, 215 So.2d at 905.
41. Jones v. Shehee Ford Wagon & Harness Co., 183 La. 293, 163 So.
129 (1935) (employee status); James v. J. S. Williams & Son, 177 La. 1033,
150 So. 9 (1933) (scope of employment); Valley v. Clay, 151 La. 710, 92 So.
308 (1922) (scope of employment); Godchaux v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co., 144
La. 1041, 81 So. 706 (1919) (scope of employment); McAllister v. Jackson
Brewing Co., 6 So.2d 179 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1942) (employee status); Crysel
v. Gifford-Hill & Co., 158 So. 264 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935).
42. See Atkins v. Points, 148 La. 958, 88 So. 231 (1921); Black v. Rock
Island, A. & L. R.R. Co., 125 La. 101, 51 So. 82 (1910); Carmouche v. Bouis,
6 La. Ann. 95 (1851); Taylor v. Mexican Gulf Ry. Co., 2 La. Ann. 654 (1847).
43. See Taylor v. Mexican Gulf Ry. Co., 2 La. Ann. 654 (1847).
44. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1949-1950 Term-
Torts, 11 LA. L. REv. 186, 190 (1951).
45. See, e.g., King v. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217, 204 S.W. 296 (1918); Note, 38
HARV. L. REV. 513 (1925); Note, 14 TExAs L. Rzv. 234 (1936); Note, 39 YALz
L.J. 1058 (1930).
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Louisiana.40 Though the Civil Code provides for parental tort
liability for the child's acts, it makes no mention of the husband's
liability for his wife's torts.4 In the search for a solvent de-
fendant in suits arising from the wife's negligent operation of
the family automobile, the Louisiana Supreme Court produced
the "community errand" doctrine, which has been referred to as
"stranger and more cumbersome to administer than even the
family purpose doctrine. '48 The doctrine was firmly established
in the jurisprudence in the case of Adams v. Golson,49 though
in several cases prior to 193750 the Louisiana courts had used
the agency rationale found in Adams. The finding of a principal-
agent relationship between husband and wife in which the wife
was authorized to perform community functions and was actually
performing such functions at the time of the accident was the
basis of the "community errand" principle.51 There is no doubt
that the supreme court was imposing liability on the husband
for the torts of his "agent." Chief Justice Fournet, the author of
Adams, said later in Martin v. Brown,52 "the very basis of liabil-
ity in such cases for a tort committed in the husband's absence
by the wife while using an automobile belonging to the commu-
nity is agency . . . 5
After Adams, with the husband's liability for his wife's
torts predicated on her status as an agent of the community on a
46. Adams v. Golson, 187 La. 363, 174 So. 876 (1937); Benton v. Griffith,
184 So. 371 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1938); Tuck v. Harmon, 151 So. 803 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1934); Davis v. Shaw, 142 So. 301 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1932); Globe
Indemnity Co. v. Quesenberry & Wife, 1 La. App. 364 (1st Cir. 1924). Comment,
7 LA. L. Rzv. 558 (1947): "Louisiana has expressly rejected the 'family pur-
pose' doctrine on the ground that liability for damages in Louisiana must
clearly be expressed or implied from the articles of the Code. The courts
have interpreted articles 2315-2320, dealing with offenses and quasi-offenses,
as not recognizing the liability upon which the doctrine is based."
47. LA. Crv. CODE art. 2320. Note, 15 TUL. L. REv. 614, 615 (1941): "The
same construction [as given in LA. Cxv. CODE arts. 2317-23221 is given to simi-
lar provisions of the French Civil Code .... Hence, in both Louisiana and
France a husband is not liable for the torts of his wife, since such liability
is not specifically recognized by the Code."
48. The Work of the Loui.ana Supreme Court for the 1949-1950 Term-
Torts, 11 LA. L. REv. 186, 190 (1951).
49. 187 La. 363, 174 So. 876 (1937).
50. See Tuck v. Harmon, 151 So. 803 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934); Tarleton-
Gaspard v. Malochee, 183 So. 409 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1931).
51. Adams v. Golson, 187 La. 863, 371, 174 So. 876, 879 (1937). Interpreting
LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2317-2322, the court concluded that a husband was not
liable for his wife's torts committed out of his presence. Id. at 370, 174 So.
at 878, citing McClure v. McMartin, 104 La. 496, 29 So. 227 (1901).
52. 240 La. 674, 124 So.2d 904 (1960).
53. Id. at 682, 124 So.2d at 907.
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community mission, it became necessary to formulate, piecemeal,
what was or was not a "community errand."14 Illustrative of
the confusion created by this development was Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co. v. Simms, 5 in which the wife, desiring to make a
personal trip in the family car, had to take the car to a garage
for repairs before leaving. As the wife turned into the garage,
she injured plaintiff and suit was brought against the husband.
The court found the journey to get the repairs merely incidental
to her personal mission and refused to hold the husband liable.56
In 1950 the supreme court reconsidered Adams v. Golson5 and
considerably broadened the scope of the "community errand" in
Brantley v. Clarkson." The court abandoned the distinction be-
tween the purpose of the wife's mission as was made in Adams,
and recognized that the torts committed by the wife while on
an errand to indulge in her own pleasures and recreation should
be the responsibility of the community as long as she has the
husband's expressed or implied permission to use the community
automobile. 9
It is submitted that basing the husband's liability for the
wife's torts on a principal-agent relationship is incorrect. A
correct basis for the liability would be reliance on Civil Code
article 2404: "the husband is the head and master of the partner-
ship or community of gains; he administers its effects ... ." and
the finding of a master-servant relationship between husband
54. Cases finding a community errand include Levy v. New Orleans &
Northeastern Ry., 20 So.2d 559 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1945) (a trip to wife's
dressmaker); Meibaum v. Campisi, 16 So.2d 257 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1944)
(trip to repair furniture used in community household); Paderas v. Stauffer,
120 So. 886 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1929) (any errand for selecting clothes, hats
or articles for adornment of the wife).
A personal errand, with no community liability, was found in Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Simms, 200 So. 34 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1941) (visit to wife's
relatives); Adams v. Golson, 187 La. 363, 174 So. 876 (1937) (attending a style
show or a fraternal meeting); Durel v. Flach, 1 La. App. 758 (Orl. Cir. 1925)
(a "Joy ride").
55. 200 So. 34 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1941).
56. Professor Malone, speaking of Simms, said: "Even the bastard 'fam-
ily purpose doctrine' involves no such nonsense." The Work of the Louisiana
supreme Court for the 1949-1950 Term-Torts, 11 LA. L. RIsv. 186, 191 (1951).
57. 187 La. 363, 174 So. 876 (1937).
58. 217 La. 425, 46 So.2d 614 (1950).
59. Id. at 433, 46 So.2d at 617: "If the husband, in using a car belonging
to the community, commits a tort while on an errand in which he is to
indulge in his own pleasures and recreation and thereby becomes liable,
there is no reason which suggests itself why the same community, out of
which the liability may have to be paid, should not likewise be liable for a
tort committed by the wife under the same circumstances."
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and wife. The wife would then be a gratuitous servant 0 and
the husband-master would have the right to control her physical
movements which is necessary to hold him and the community
liable for her torts committed while she was reasonably per-
forming a community function.1 By using the proper Code basis
for liability, the same result could be reached and the rationale
would be in strict accordance with the Civil Code.
Automobile Dealers and Prospective Purchasers
An automobile dealer's liability for damages inflicted by
the negligent driving of prospective purchasers is another area
in which Louisiana courts have used incorrect agency termi-
nology. The accidents occur either with a representative of
the dealer in the car, or with the prospective purchaser alone
or accompanied by a guest passenger.
When the prospective purchaser is alone in the car or with
a guest passenger, the Louisiana courts refuse to allow recovery
against the dealer by an injured third person,82 except when
a dealer or one acting for him allows an incompetent driver to
operate the automobile.6 In Graham v. American Employers'
Insurance Co.8 4 the court said, "we conclude that Mrs. Rogers
[the prospective purchaser] was not the agent of McConathy-
Young, Inc. [the dealer], and that it is not responsible for the
injuries sustained."65 Although the court held the prospective
purchaser to be a bailee for whose torts the bailor [dealer] was
not liable and thus reached a correct result, it is submitted that
even if the court had determined that Mrs. Rogers was an agent,
the dealer would not have been liable under the Civil Code.6
60. The gratuitous servant concept is recognized in Bates v. Largars,
193 So.2d 375 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966); Smith v. Foucha, 172 So.2d 318 (La.
App. 4th Cir.), writ refused, 247 La. 678, 173 So.2d 542 (1965).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AoENCY § 225 (1957): "One who volunteers ser-
vices without an agreement or expectation of reward may be a servant of
the one accepting such services."
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229, comment a (1957).
62. E.g., Massony v. Truett Nash Motor Co., 177 So. 829 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1938); Graham v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 171 So. 471 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1937).
63. See Serpas v. Collard Motors, 178 So. 261 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1938)
(salesman allowed intoxicated prospective purchaser to operate the car
alone).
64. 171 So. 471 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937).
65. Id. at 473.
66. LA. CIvM CODE arts. 2985-3033. See also note 7 supra and accompany-
ing text.
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The prospective purchaser must have been a servant of the dealer
to impose tort liability on the dealer, and without the right to
control the physical movements of the servant, a right clearly
absent in this situation, no such master-servant relationship
exists.67
The same result is reached when damage is caused by the
negligent operation of the car by one acting not for the pros-
pective purchaser, but out of his own curiosity. In Bogus v.
Strange,6 the accident occurred on the parking lot of a grocery
store and resulted from the negligence of a curious friend of the
prospective purchaser. The court found no relationship between
the third person and either the prospective purchaser or the
dealer on which vicarious liability could be based.
When a representative of the dealer is in the car with the
prospective purchaser-driver at the time of the accident, the
status of the dealer's representative, whether servant or agent,
should determine the dealer's liability. Unfortunately, the Lou-
isiana courts usually have failed to examine the representative's
status and have held the representative to be the dealer's agent
and the prospective purchaser a subagent, thus making the
dealer liable for any damage caused by the subagent.69 The
salesman may well be an employee of the dealership, which
would make him a servant for purposes of tort liability. How-
ever, the courts should make clear his servant status, since if
he were a non-servant agent it would be incorrect to hold the
dealer liable for a prospective purchaser's accident. Such lan-
guage as "the dealer is exposed to liability for the negligence
of Aiken [prospective purchaser], the subagent . .. since the
salesman remained in the car beside Aiken . . . and was in a
position to . . . direct and control the driver,"70 is incorrect and
the proper inquiry should be into the status of the dealer's repre-
67. Mohr v. Schmitt, 189 So.2d 46, 49 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966): "In all
Instances of vicarious liability, the right of control is sacramental. The basis
for holding the principal for the acts of the agent, the master for the ser-
vant .... the parent for the acts of the child, all stem from the right of
control. In the absence of the right of control, there is no liability."
68. 192 So.2d 566 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966). The third person, on his own,
attempted to start the standard shift automobile, thinking it was in neutral.
The car was actually in gear and lurched forward, pinning plaintiff between
the auto and a vending machine.
69. See, e.g., Smith v. Howard Crumley & Co., 171 So. 188 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1936).
70. Id. at 193.
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sentative. The proper basis for the dealer's liability would be a
master-servant relationship between dealer and salesman, cou-
pled with recognition of the salesman's power, within the scope
of his employment, to allow prospective purchasers to test drive
the automobile.
When the salesman alone negligently operates one of the
dealer's automobiles and the injured person seeks to hold the
dealer liable, the court's inquiry should again be into the rela-
tionship between dealer and salesman. Such was the situation
in Blanchard v. Ogima,71 involving a "bird-dog"7 2 salesman who
negligently parked the dealer's car on a hill so that it rolled
down the hill and struck plaintiff. In the automobile business
a "bird-dog" salesman, as opposed to a full-time employee-sales-
man, may obtain buyers for several different dealers and is
usually not considered an employee by any of them. The dealers
have no control over the "bird-dog" salesman's methods or his
physical movements and merely supply him with cars for which
he has found a buyer. Agreeing with the lower court's finding
that the relationship between the dealer and the salesman was
one of principal-agent, the supreme court held that the dealer
was free from liability since the salesman was a non-servant
agent.78 Blanchard represents the first clear recognition by the
supreme court of the distinction between a non-servant agent,
whose principal is not liable for the agent's physical torts, and
a servant, upon whose master article 2320 imposes liability for
the physical torts of the servant.
71. 253 La. 34, 215 So.2d 902 (1968).
72. Id. at 38, 215 So.2d at 903: "This term is derived from such a sales-
man's practice of 'flushing' out a prospect for the purchase of a certain type
of car. The salesman then makes an arrangement with a car dealer to offer
the car to the prospect, and is paid on commission or by retaining all of the
purchase price above an agreed figure."
73. Id. at 48-49, 215 So.2d at 907: "The only control which Russo [the
dealer] exercised over Ogima [the salesman] was that he should obtain at
least a fixed minimum sum for the car he sold. Russo could not determine
to whom the sale was to be made, the time to be spent in effectuating the
sale, or the place of sale, nor could he control any of the details of Ogima's
physical conduct in effecting the sale."
It is submitted that in Morton v. American Employers Ins. Co., 104
So.2d 189 (La. App. Cir. 1958), the principal was not held liable for the torts
of his agent, but his insurer was held liable under the omnibus clause in
the insurance policy.
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Gasoline Dealers and Distributors
The nature of the distribution system utilized by the major
oil producing companies to supply the consumer with their
products has created confusion in the jurisprudence concerning
the producer's liability for the torts committed by the distribu-
tors and their employees. These distributors are normally of
two kinds: the wholesale bulk distributor operating primarily
within one geographical area and usually dealing exclusively
in the products of one company, and the retail service station
operator.
In an early case, Montgomery v. Gulf Refining Co.,7 4 the
Louisiana Supreme Court held the producer liable for the injury
inflicted on plaintiff by the negligent driving of an employee
of the distributor. The court based its holding on the facts that
under the contract between Gulf and the distributor, the gasoline
still belonged to Gulf, and that gasoline is a dangerous instru-
mentality for which its owner must be liable. The determination
of the producer's liability should be made on the basis of its
right to control the physical movements of the distributor rather
than product ownership. If the producer has the right to con-
trol the physical manner in which the operations are to be
carried out, the distributor will be a servant for whose torts
the producer is liable.15
The contractual arrangement between the distributor and
the producer may specify that the product is to remain the
property of the producer until sold, that the proceeds of all
sales are to go to the refiner, that the company can set prices
and control the extension of credit and also may contain a
"hold-harmless" clause in which the distributor agrees to be
liable for any tortious act committed by himself or his em-
ployees70 The Louisiana courts view any "hold-harmless" clause
betv n the producer and the distributor as ineffective and un-
enforceable against third persons." In these oil distributor cases,
74. 168 La. 73, 121 So. 578 (1929).
75. See note 66 supra.
76. See Goff v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 162 So. 452 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935).
Under such an arrangement a court might view all the controls by the
producer as merely contractual features rather than control of the details
and physical movements of selling oil products. See Jones v. Standerfer, 296
Ill. App. 145, 15 N.E.2d 924 (1938).
77. Goff v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 162 So. 452 (La. App. 2d dir. 1935).
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as elsewhere, there is no basis in law for holding a principal
liable for the torts of his non-servant agent. Such statements
as "[the distributor] is the agent of the Texas Company. .. and,
consequently, the driver of the truck is the sub-agent of the
Texas Company and the Texas Company is answerable for the
tort committed by either . ...,78 clearly demonstrate the con-
fusion of the courts. The retail distributors may be independent
business men or employees of the producing company. In Mo-
netti v. Standard Oil Co.,79 the court held the producer liable for
plaintiff's injuries suffered when a service station employee,
clearing the station's driveway, negligently pushed a motor-
cycle into plaintiff's softdrink stand. Though referring to the
retailer as an agent, it is apparent from the facts that the re-
tailer was an employee-servant s of Standard Oil Co., and thus
the producer was correctly held liable for the torts of one of
its servants. In the case of a retailer over whom the producer
neither exercises nor has the right to exercise any control, the
producer should not be held liable for the torts of the retailer
or his employees.81
Convicts and Prisoners
Only a few Louisiana cases have considered the relationship
between the State of Louisiana and the prisoners held in its
penal institutions with regard to the State's vicarious liability
for a prisoner's torts.8 2 In Aguillard v. State,88 the State was
held liable for the injuries plaintiff sustained in a head-on
78. Dockens v. LaCaze, 78 F. Supp. 515, 517 (W.D. La. 1948).
79. 195 So. 89 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1940).
80. Id. at 91: "It is well to remember that Gomez himself was not an
independent contractor. Not only is he designated in the contract as an
agent of the oil company and not only is he shown to have been employed
to manage and operate the oil station for the company, but it appears that
the company retained the right to control entirely his operations in manag-
ing the said station and the further right to discharge him at will by termi-
nating the contract."
81. See Donovan v. Standard Oil Co., 197 So. 320 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1940).
The retailer had borrowed a Standard Oil truck from the bulk plant next
door, to return plaintiffs to their automobile and replace a tire. En route,
the retailer's employee negligently lost control of the truck and the plain-
tiffs sought unsuccessfully to hold the producer liable for damages inflicted
by the employee. The retailer in this case had the right to buy and sell any
goods whether handled by Standard Oil or not, could set prices on his goods
and services, and employed his own assistants.
82. See Dauzat v. Crites, 237 So.2d 697 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970); Trahan v.
State, 158 So.2d 417 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963); Aguillard v. State, 7 So.2d 645
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1942).
83. 7 So.2d 645 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1942).
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collision with an Angola Prison truck being negligently driven
by a prison trustee. Plaintiff claimed that the negligence occurred
while the trustee was in the course and scope of his employ-
ment. In none of its defenses did the State claim the trustee
was not an employee or a servant.8 4 Therefore, by holding the
State liable for the injuries caused by a negligent trustee, the
court, at least impliedly, found the trustee to be a servant.
Though the result reached in Aguillard would appear to be
desirable from a policy viewpoint, two later cases have reached
the opposite conclusion and have denied recovery against the
State for a prisoner's torts.8 5 In Trahan v. State,86 a trustee sued
the State to recover for the injuries he sustained when he was
struck by a ricocheting bullet fired by a second trustee at pri-
soners who were allegedly escaping. The court, in refusing
recovery, listed four factors necessary to establish a master-
servant relationship: selection and engagement, payment of
wages, power of dismissal, and power of control.8 7 It was then
said that "the factors of selection and payment of wages warrant
a finding of no master-servant relationship .... The state does
not select the prisoner to be its employee, nor does the prisoner
voluntarily agree to work for the state."8 8 The importance of
the voluntary nature of the employment and the pay involved
in the trustee program was considered and rejected, since the
trustee program was found not to be a method of hiring em-
ployees for the State.8 9
In Dauzat v. Crites,90 an Orleans Parish Prison trustee,
84. Id. at 647.
85. Dauzat v. Crites, 237 So.2d 697 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970); Trahan v.
State, 158 So.2d 417 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
86. 158 So.2d 417 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
87. Id. at 418.
88. Id.
89. Id. The court relied on a statement in Brown v. Jamesburg State
Home for Boys, 60 N.J. Super. 123, 158 A.2d 445 (1960), that to consider pris-
oners the employees of the penal officers would be contrary to public policy.
Brown dealt with a workman's compensation claim filed by a prisoner when
he was run over by a tractor while working on a prison farm.
Strictly from a policy standpoint, a distinction might be made between
Trahan and Aguillard v. State, 7 So.2d 645 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1942), in that
Agu4llard involved an Innocent member of the general public while another
prisoner had caused the injury in Trahan. It is submitted that cases of this
nature are rare and to prevent imposition of a loss on a totally innocent
third party (since a judgment against a prisoner would probably be mean-
ingless), the state should admit its liability for the negligent torts of pris-
oners involving injury to members of the public.
90. 237 So.2d 697 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
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directed to move an employee's car from one parking place to
another, negligently pulled out in front of plaintiff-motorcyclist.
In refusing to allow recovery against the State, the court said,
"we are in complete agreement with the conclusion that a
trusty [sic] in a penal institution is not an employee . . . of
the State and the State is not responsible for his negligence
under the doctrine of respondeat superior."91
It is submitted that in both Dauzat and Trahan the absolute
right to control the inmates existed in the prison authorities,
thereby creating a master-servant relationship sufficient to im-
pose tort liability on the master. Trustees are selected from
the general prison populace, can be stripped of their trustee
status, and may be paid some form of wages or may receive
"good time" credit which shortens the period of their incarcera-
tion. Though it is submitted that the payment of wages is not
a necessary factor in finding a master-servant relationship, 2
the four requirements for servant status called for in Trahan9s
are at least partially present in the case of trustees. Under
the Civil Code the courts should hold the sheriff liable for the
torts of his employee-servant if a deputy is directed to move
the car and injures the plaintiff.9 ' Therefore, it seems inequi-
table to deny plaintiff in the Dauzat situation relief simply be-
cause a trustee, rather than an employee, was ordered to move
the car.
Conclusion
The Louisiana Civil Code clearly provides a basis for the
liability of a master for the torts committed by his servants
in the course of their employment.95 The imposition of such
vicarious liability on any other basis is incorrect and the Lou-
isiana courts should determine the nature of the relationship
involved whenever they seek to apply vicarious liability. Such
a determination was correctly made in Jones v. Maryland Casu-
alty Co.,96 an action against a homeowner's liability insurer for
the drowning of a 14-year-old boy in the homeowner's swim-
91. Id. at 699, citing Trahan v. State, 158 So.2d 417 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
92. See note 60 supra.
93. 158 So.2d 417, 418 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
94. LA. Civ. CODm art. 2320.
95. Id.
96. 256 So.2d 358 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
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ming pool. Plaintiff maintained that the homeowner's mother,
who had given the youth permission to swim in the pool, was
the servant of the homeowner and liability was imputable to
the homeowner under a master-servant relationship. The First
Circuit decided the mother was a non-servant agent of the
homeowner, empowered only to maintain the property, and thus
no liability was imputable to either her son or his insurer. It is
submitted that such a result is correct and an examination of
the relationship involved will yield a proper result in every
case embracing the doctrine of respondeat superior.
John S. Odom, Jr.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS IN LOUISIANA
The Declaratory Judgments Act1 has been the source of
considerable confusion for both the courts and the practicing
bar. This apparently has stemmed from a misunderstanding of
the basic nature of declaratory relief, the nature of the action.2
Basically, a declaratory judgment declares the rights, status
or legal relations of the parties.8 It gives a party a remedy that
supplements the remedies heretofore available, and differs from
a conventional remedy in that while a conventional remedy is
accompanied by a granting of damages or other relief, the declar-
atory judgment stands alone: 4
"The conventional type of judgment embodies two ele-
ments: (1) an ascertainment or declaration of the rights
of the parties (usually implied); and (2) a specific award
of relief. The declaratory judgment embodies only the
first element which, of course, is always express."5
Thus, declaratory relief can be viewed as a lesser form of relief
1. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 1871-83. This legislation Is modeled on the Uni-
form Declaratory Judgments Act and bears a close resemblance to the fed-
eral declaratory judgments statutes as well as the legislation in other states
based on the uniform act.
2. This Comment does not purport to examine all phases of the Declara-
tory Judgments Act. It attempts to deal with some of the basic concepts
underlying declaratory judgments so as to aid the practitioner in utilizing
them.
3. Succession of Rickerfor, 120 So.2d 320 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1960).
4. E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 25 (1941); Succession of Ricker-
for, 120 So.2d 320 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1960).
5. LA. CODE Civ, P. art. 1871, comment.
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